

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS


ORDER OF CONTINUANCE AND EXCLUDABLE DELAY UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

Upon consideration of the United States' motion seeking an order of continuance and excludable delay, the Court finds as follows:

1. In a motion filed on March 26, 2018, the United States discussed the need for excluding the period from March 19, 2018 (the previous trial date), through and including April 30, 2018 (the first day of trial, as rescheduled), from the speedy trial clock, pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), and Sections 5(b)(7)(B) and 5(c)(1)(A) of the *Plan for Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases* for the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (effective December 2008), on the ground that the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance and excluding these periods outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. The government stated that, given the volume of discovery in this case and the complexity of the issues presented by this matter, the parties agree that exclusion of this period is warranted in order to give the defendant an opportunity to continue his review of the discovery and both parties an opportunity to meet with witnesses, select exhibits, discuss possible stipulations, draft motions *in limine*, and undertake other pretrial preparations, that this

period constitutes the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).

2. For the reasons stated in paragraph 1, the Court orders that the time from March 19, 2018, through and including April 30, 2018, be excluded from the time within which the above-captioned case must be tried under the Speedy Trial Act, as the ends of justice served by such exclusion outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Richard M. Stearns". The signature is fluid and cursive, with "Richard" and "M." being more stylized and "Stearns" having a more traditional look.

Dated: 3-28-18.